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GERMAN AIR FORCE OPPOSITION TO STRATEGIC BOMBING IN THE FIRST FOUR MONTHS OF 1944

German air force opposition to strategic bombing in the first four months of 1944

An analysis of GAF defensive fighter effort on the Western Front as measured in terms of GAF and Eighth USAAF operating ratios.

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1 June 1944

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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1. The present study is in large measure a supplement to German Air Force Scale of Effort in 1943.[1] The present study brings up to date through the first four months of 1944 some of the measures of GAF scale of effort presented in the earlier paper. It differs, however, in two respects: (a) it treats only the Western Front; and (b) it introduces certain new concepts, notably, the measurement of GAF scale of effort in terms of Eighth USAAF operating ratios. A similar study of GAF opposition as measured by RAF operating ratios is in progress, and, if significant results are obtained, will be issued as a supplement to the present paper.

2. GAF fighter sorties in the West have increased in the first four months of 1944 to an alltime peak. The percentage increase over 1943 is approximately as great as the percentage increase in the member of British-based heavy bombers attacking.

3. As in 1943, fluctuations in the weekly total of GAF fighter sorties correlate fairly well with fluctuations week by week in the level of Allied bomber attacks. There is better correlation with Eighth USAAF attacks, however, than with total Allied attacks.

4. During the first four months of 1944, the German fighter force in the West was used more intensively, in

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1 Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, R and A No. 1746, 1 March 1944.

the sense that more sorties were flown per aircraft, than in any previous comparable period. The increase over 1943, however, was not striking and was achieved largely because offensive operations against the continent were more consistently maintained than in any earlier period.

5. Although scale of effort, measured in sorties, was relatively high compared with previous effort on this front, the qualitative intensity of opposition continued low, and probably declined. The low level of production has compelled drastic conservation measures, so that, although enemy fighters have frequently been airborne, their aggressiveness has been low, except against stragglers, formations without escort, or formations which have been broken up. This fact, universally established by the testimony of Eighth USAAF flying personnel, is statistically borne out by a comparison of the trend of estimated wastage with the trend of fighter sorties.

6. There is a sharp distinction, in terms of percentage loss of Eighth USAAF bombers attacking, among shallow, deep blind, and deep visual attacks. Within each category, the number lost correlates roughly with the number attacking, but operational factors make the correlation only approximate. A similar sharp distinction among these three types of attacks is revealed by the percentage of fighter escort lost, by the number of enemy aircraft claimed per 100 escorting fighters dispatched, and by the number of enemy aircraft

claimed by fighters and by bombers per 100 bombers attacking.

7. Over the four months, some reduction in the intensity of opposition to shallow and to deep bling attacks is suggested by the operating ratios studied. The operating ratios do not, however, support any conclusion that the intensity of opposition to deep visual attacks has declined over the period.

I. OVER-ALL GAF OPPOSITION TO THE COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE

A. GAF Fighter Sorties

As was the case throughout most of 1943, GAF defensive fighter sorties in the West in the first four months of 1944 kept pace with the growing weight of the Allied bomber attack. Chart I on the following page compares monthly GAF fighter sorties with the monthly total number of heavy bombers attacking, for 1943 and the first four months of 1944. Plotted on a semi-logarithmic scale, the rate of increase of defensive fighter sorties is seen to correspond closely with the rate of increase in the number of bombers attacking. Plotted on a plain scale, a striking increase is noted in the spread between bombers attacking and defensive fighter sorties -- i.e., the disparity in numbers, in absolute terms, has been steadily increasing.[1] Proportionately, however, the German defensive effort, measured in sorties, has been largely maintained. This striking increase in defensive effort appears all the more remarkable because of the fact that, at least until March 1944, the increase in Allied bombers attacking has been secured even more by a constant increase in the average size of individual missions than by an increase in the number of days per month on which attacks have been mounted. If the increase in bomber activity had been largely

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1. German Air Force Scale of Effort in 1943, p. 8 and 8a.

CHART I

TOTAL ALLIED HEAVY BOMBERS ATTACKING, AND
TOTAL GERMAN AIR FORCE DEFENSIVE FIGHTER SORTIES,
WESTERN FRONT, 1943 - 1944

(Ratio scale: lines of equal slope show equal percentage increase; an equal spread between lines shows a constant proportion between the values.)



achieved by an increased frequency of operation, the parallel increase in fighter sorties would not have been so remarkable an achievement.

As in 1943,[1] weekly figures show a generally good correlation between Allied bomber and GAF fighter efforts. Chart II, on the following page, illustrates this continued covariation, which appears to be weaker, however, in April than in the earlier months, probably in part reflecting the beginning in April of pre-invasion, semi-tactical bombing. Plotted on the same chart with total Allied bombers attacking and GAF defensive sorties is the total number of Eighth USAAF bomber attacks. It will be seen that GAF fighter sorties correlated more closely with Eighth USAAF activity than with total RAF plus Eighth USAAF effort, reflecting the fact that the greater part of the GAF defensive effort is directed against daylight bombing.

B. Intensity of Use of GAF Fighters

In determining intensity of air-force effort, the ratio of sorties to strength is of equal or greater significance than the absolute scale of effort measured in sorties. Chart III, on page 5, shows GAF fighter sorties as a percent of initial equipment (IE) fighter strength on the Western Front, by weeks in 1944, and by months since January 1943. Study of the chart reveals that the level of activity in the first four months of 1944 was higher, as a percentage of IE strength, than during

1. German Air Force Scale of Effort in 1943, pp. 8-9.

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CHART II

TOTAL ALLIED HEAVY BOMBERS ATTACKING, TOTAL GERMAN AIR FORCE DEFENSIVE FIGHTER SORTIES, AND 8th AF HEAVY BOMBERS ATTACKING, WESTERN FRONT, WEEKLY, 1944



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CHART III

GERMAN AIR FORCE DAILY OFFENSIVE FIGHTER SORTIES AS A PERCENTAGE OF INITIAL ESTABLISHMENT FIGHTER STRENGTH, WESTERN FRONT
MONTHLY AVERAGES, 1943, AND MONTHLY AND WEEKLY AVERAGES, 1944



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any four-month period in 1943, and indicates that the increase in sorties was largely proportional to the increase in strength. However, it should be noted that these figures are based on IE strength, not actual strength, satisfactory figures for which are not presently available. It is known, however, that actual strength has been declining relative to IE strength, particularly in the last few months, so that it can be clearly concluded that the rate of utilization of strength in the first four months of 1944 was measurably, though not spectacularly, higher than at any time in 1943. Nevertheless, it is also clear that the percentage-utilization in the West, even in these four months, was comparatively low, averaging less than 20 percent. In part this is a result of the nature of activity on this front; in part, too, it reflects continued conservation of effort.[1]

C. Qualitative Intensity of Use

Although GAF fighter sorties in the West were at peak levels in the first four months of 1944, both in absolute terms and as a percent of strength, there nevertheless appears to have been a continued deterioration, or at least a continued low level of aggressiveness and qualitative intensity of opposition. Fighter sorties do not equal fighter opposition, because many fighters which are airborne may not engage the attacking force, or may do so only in a half-hearted manner. It is difficult to

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1. See German Air Force Scale of Effort in 1943, pp. 6-7, 15.

demonstrate this low level of aggressiveness in statistical terms, because there is no acceptable series of data showing the number of enemy aircraft actually "encountered" (if that term could be defined), and because there can be no quantitative measurement of "aggressiveness." However, the fact that opposition is qualitatively low is clearly borne out by the continued reports of pilots and gunners, which are very frequently in terms such as the following: "Enemy aircraft seen at a distance, no attacks"; "Enemy fighters made a few half-hearted passes at the formation, but quickly withdrew"; "Opposition was confined entirely to stragglers and planes that broke formation"; "The only opposition came during a brief period between the departure of the penetration escort and the arrival of the target escort." The exceptional occasions on which opposition is vigorous and sustained have occurred almost invariably when one wing or squadron has become separated from the main force. In such cases the opposition has been not only intense but skillful in execution. It would appear, therefore, that the lack of aggressive opposition is the result of policies of conservation, and is not due to lack of training and experience of GAF pilots. In fact, it is quite possible that, in view of the limited number of aircraft available, only the most experienced pilots are used.

In addition to pilots' qualitative descriptions one probably significant piece of quantitative evidence is available to indicate the non-aggressive character of the GAF fighter effort. This is presented in Chart IV, on the following page, which shows British Air Ministry estimates of GAF fighter wastage on the Western Front by months, compared with fighter sorties. Although these figures must be used with caution,[1] still there appears to be a significant failure of wastage to increase in proportion to sorties, especially since September and October 1943. Wastage in February and March was only slightly above that of September and October, while sorties were almost double.

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CHART IV

GERMAN AIRFORCE AVERAGE DAILY FIGHTER SORTIES COMPARED WITH MONTHLY FIGHTER WASTAGE, WESTERN FRONT, JULY 1943 - APRIL 1944

(Ratio scale: lines of equal slope show equal percentage increase; an equal spread between lines shows a constant proportion between the values.)



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II. GAF OPPOSITION MEASURED IN TERMS OF EIGHTH USAAF OPERATING RATIOS

A. Explanation of Method

For the purpose of the computations which follow, all Eighth USAAF heavy-bomber operations in the four months under consideration were divided into three categories:

(1) "Shallow" -- Attacks on targets located in France, Holland, or Belgium, or in Germany west of a line drawn roughly east of Hamburg, Bremen, and the Ruhr, and west of Rostock, Hannover, Kassel, Frankfurt, Mainz, and Ludvigshafen.

(2) "Deep blind" -- Attacks on targets not included in the "shallow" category, but made under heavy cloud conditions, requiring the use of pathfinder equipment.

(3) "Deep visual" -- Attacks on targets not included in the "shallow" category, with cloud conditions such that most bombing was visual.

It was impossible to divide all operations into these classes with complete accuracy because the operational data used frequently referred to a combined mission which embraced operations falling into more than one of the above categories. In such cases, the figures are attributed to that category which appears to represent the predominant type of activity.

Table 1, on the following page, shows, by months, the number of bombers attacking[1] in each category, and the number of days on which attacks of each type were made.

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1. For the purposes of this study a perhaps unorthodox definition of "bombers attacking" has been used. The figure desired was one which could be compared with bombers lost as a measure of opposition encountered. Bombers dispatched is in general unsatisfactory because a varying but substantial percentage of bombers dispatched is abortive and hence meets no opposition. On the other hand, some bombers actually make substantial penetrations over the continent but do not "attack" because they are unable to find their primary or secondary target, or a target of opportunity, and either jettison or return with their bombs. Hence neither bombers dispatched nor attacking is an adequate figure for comparative purposes. However, it was believed that, in general, bombers attacking (primary, secondary, or opportunity targets) was the better figure for comparative purposes. There has been added to this figure, however, for the purpose of this study, the number of bombers lost, on the assumption that these, like the bombers attacking, have received or been in a position to receive enemy opposition. Although the resulting figure is a questionable hybrid, it is believed to be, on the whole, a better figure than either bombers dispatched or bombers attacking (by the usual definition).

Table 1. EIGHTH USAAF HEAVY BOMBERS ATTACKING, BY TYPE OF ATTACK, JANUARY - APRIL 1944

Type of attack	January		February		March		April	
	Number of bombers attacking	No. of days	Number of bombers attacking	No. of days	Number of bombers attacking	No. of days	Number of bombers attacking	No. of days
Shallow	2,553	5	2,414	12	2,470	12	3,596	10
Deep blind	2,142	3	2,318	6	4,330	11	1,407	3
Deep visual	663	1	2,247	5	1,889	3	4,643	7
All types	5,358	9	6,979	18[a]	8,689	23[a]	9,646	20

a. The total number of days of operation for all types of missions is less than the sum of its three components because on some days more than one type of mission was flown.

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B. Bomber Losses

In Chart V, on the following page, the number of bombers lost on each mission[1] is plotted against the number of bombers attacking, in a scatter diagram. Also shown, for each type of attack, is the average percentage loss for the entire period, plotted as a diagonal line through the origin.[2] From the chart it is apparent that:

(1) In general, a proportionally higher number of bombers was lost on deep visual missions than on deep blind, and on deep blind than on shallow.

(2) In general, within each category, the number lost increased in rough proportion to the number attacking.

(3) There is, however, only very rough correlation between number attacking and number lost, and other factors must be used to explain the remaining variation. Some of the more notable exceptions can be associated with unusual condi-

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1. In every case where the term "mission" is used, it will mean an attack on a single target or on a group of targets where these data cannot be broken down by target. In some cases it is the total for a day's operations.

2. It will be seen that the diagonal lines are not technically regression lines, and do not necessarily "fit" the data, except on the assumption that the relationship between number attacking and number lost is linear, necessarily passing through the origin.

CHART V

8th AF HEAVY BOMBERS ATTACKING, AND NUMBER LOST, BY MISSION, JANUARY - APRIL 1944

(Nineteen "shallow" missions with fewer than 100 bombers attacking are not plotted; for 12 of these, losses were zero; for 4, losses were one; and for 3, losses were two)



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tions,[1] and in the other cases the variation can generally be explained in terms of differences in the type of target (airdromes vs. "military installations" on the Channel coast), in the depth of the penetration (within each category), in the weather en route or over England (affecting the difficulty of maintaining formation, the ability of GAF fighters to operate, navigational errors, etc.), the intensity of AA fire, and so on.

Chart VI-A, on the following page, shows the trend of bomber losses over the four months, by type of attack. The most notable feature of the results is the apparent decline in the percentage loss on deep visual attacks to 5 percent in April. To what extent this indicates a decline in opposition to attacks of this type will be discussed below in section G. The sharp rise in April in percentage loss on deep blind attacks is due

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1. For example, the dot marked "a" on the diagram is the mission of 29 April against Berlin, on which occasion the bomber formations, due largely to weather, became dispersed. In the aggressive attacks which followed, 63 bombers were lost. Dots "b", "c", and "d" were occasions on which large numbers of bombers were dispatched, but, due to weather conditions, the number attacking was only a small fraction of the number actually over the continent and presumably engaged by defensive fighters. These three occasions were, respectively, a mission of 3 March when 748 bombers were dispatched against objectives in Central Germany, and only 90 attacked; the mission of 1 April against targets in South Germany (when Schaffenhausen, Switzerland was attacked), with 440 dispatched and 177 attacking; and a mission of 8 February against Frankfort, when 553 were dispatched 208 attacked.

CHART VI

8th AF OPERATING RATIOS BY TYPES OF ATTACK, JANUARY-APRIL 1944



largely to the very heavy losses on the mission of 29 April over Berlin. On this occasion the very bad weather conditions encountered caused the breaking up of formations into small units, which were heavily and successfully attacked. The average for the other deep blind operations in April was 2.35 percent, slightly below the March level. Losses on shallow attacks have ranged between 0.8 and 2.4 percent, and are almost entirely due to flak and normal operational hazards.

C. Fighter Escort Losses

Losses of fighter escort (as a percentage of the number dispatched) are shown in Chart VI-B. Losses on shallow missions ranged between 0.5 and 0.95 percent, while losses on deep missions were substantially higher and averaged about the same for blind as for visual attacks. Despite the fact that fewer German fighters are normally encountered on blind attacks, it may be that relatively high fighter losses on such attacks can be explained by the fact that bad weather is a greater handicap to fighters than to bombers (because of less adequate navigational equipment in the former). Losses on blind attacks, however, appear to be declining, and on visual attacks to be increasing. The interpretation of this change is again postponed to section G, below.

D. Fighter Claims

In a certain sense, fighter claims can be taken as a measure of opposition encountered. As such they tell an interesting

story. The pattern of fighter claims shown in Chart VI-C is distinctly similar to the pattern of fighter losses (Chart VI-B), except for the greater divergence between claims on deep blind and deep visual attacks.

E. Ratio of Fighter Claims to Fighter Losses

Table 2, on the following page, shows that Allied fighter escort scores its greatest success when the opposition is most intense. Presumably the reasons are twofold: (a) the normal operational hazards account for a certain normal percentage of operational losses (higher in bad weather, however), regardless of opposition, thus reducing the favorableness of the claim-loss ratio when opposition is light; (b) on the deep visual missions, Mustangs are used as escort for that portion of the route where opposition is expected to be most concentrated; the great superiority of the Mustang therefore raises the claim-loss ratio for such missions.

F. Total Claims: Fighter plus Bomber

Although it is generally agreed that no quantitative and little qualitative importance can be attached to bomber claims, per se, it may be noted that there is an excellent correlation (chart not reproduced) between total claims by fighters and bombers and bomber losses, mission by mission. This correlation is better than the correlation between fighter claims and fighter losses, between bomber claims and bomber losses, or between fighter losses or claims and bomber losses. Chart VI-D shows the trend of total fighter plus bomber claims per 100 bombers attacking through March (April figures are not available). It will be noted that not only do total claims correlate well with bomber losses, mission by mission, but that the monthly trends are strickingly parallel.

Table 2 -- RATIO OF CLAIMS TO LOSSES, ALLIED FIGHTER ESCORT, BY TYPE OF ATTACK, JANUARY-APRIL 1944

Type of attack	Fighter losses	Fighter claims[a]	Ratio of claims to losses[a]
Shallow	72	155 (282)	2.2 (3.7)
Deep blind	172	459 (500)	2.7 (2.9)
Deep visual	222	775 (1000)	3.5 (4.5)
All types	466	1389 (1782)	3.0 (3.8)

a. Figures in parentheses include fighter claims of aircraft destroyed on the ground.

G. Evaluation

The data summarized in Chart VI are at first glance conflicting and somewhat inconclusive. Further analysis clarifies this apparent conflict to some extent, but does not permit drawing any positive conclusions. The following points, however, are noted:

(1) There is clearly, by any test, less opposition to deep blind missions than to deep visual attacks, and still less opposition to shallow missions. Although descriptive evidence makes clear that the opposition on shallow missions is truly less intense--in fact, is typically non-existent--it cannot be positively stated that the evidence in Chart VI proves the point. On shallow missions, the bombers are obviously over the continent a much shorter period, and regardless of the intensity of the opposition, lower losses and claims would be expected. There is no reason, however, to believe that the observed lower intensity of opposition on deep blind than on deep visual missions, shown in Chart VI, can be so explained. Deep blind missions are in general just as "deep" as deep visual, and the bombers are equally long over the continent. Furthermore, close and effective fighter escort is more difficult in bad weather than in good; from that standpoint, bomber losses might be higher on deep blind missions. Bomber losses to operational causes might likewise be expected to be somewhat higher on the blind attacks. The lower level of each of the measures on blind than on visual attacks must therefore be explained in terms of the opposition encountered. This is lower on blind attacks for at least two reasons: (a) Weather over the continent on days of blind missions

has in some cases been so bad that German fighters may not have been able to operate safely; when they do operate, they may have difficulty finding the bomber formations; (b) the Germans have less fear of the results of our blind bombing attacks, for they are admittedly far less effective. The analysis does not permit any evaluation of the relative importance of the two causes.

(2) The trend of the measures over the first four months of 1944 is less clear.

(a) There is no clear trend in the shallow attacks, unless it is a slight tendency toward lowered opposition.

(b) There is a downward trend in all four measures of opposition to deep blind attacks except bomber losses. The high April figure is explained entirely in terms of the one Berlin attack referred to above. Omitting this one attack, it can probably be concluded that opposition to deep blind attacks has decreased.

(c) The apparent great disparity between the four measures of opposition to deep visual attacks is lessened when the January figure is omitted from consideration. With this omission, the pattern appears more consistent, with each measure rising in March above the February level, and falling again in April, although by varying amounts. As shown in Table 1, deep visual attacks in January were confined to a single day, 11 January, and it is therefore not appropriate to give much weight to the January results for this category. Omitting the January figure, then, it can be concluded that there is no trend in the intensity

of opposition to deep visual attacks revealed by these operating ratios, a negative, but not inconsequential conclusion.

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THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL EFFECTS OF AIR RAIDS ON THE GERMAN PEOPLE

A Preliminary Survey

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Description

An evaluation of the disruptive effects of air raids on the social and political organization of German civilian life; the effectiveness of terror, relief measures and propaganda in controlling reactions to air raids.

9 June 1944
~~8 July 1944~~

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Summary

The present level of strategic bombing of Germany has exposed only a sector of the population to the direct effects of bombing. Air raids, despite the widespread physical destruction which results, have left the German administrative and police system still highly effective. The ARP facilities are under great strain but are far from reaching the point of national collapse.

After air raids, the Germans have demonstrated their ability to restore quickly the necessary services and to maintain the life of society on the prevailing primitive level. However, mass evacuation and migration have increased the tensions between the evacuees and their "hosts," and between the urban and rural population.

There is no evidence that the air war, by destroying personal property, is developing favorable attitudes toward communism, especially among the middle classes. Civilian attitudes are characterized by political apathy and preoccupation with survival; retaliation is desired only if it can bring an end to the raids.

It is not likely that the defeatism generated by the air raids will be translated into significant political action as long as the control machinery continues to operate.

This paper attempts, in its first part, to give a survey of the recent measures adopted by the Nazi government for coping with the intensified air war. The second part discusses the social and political effects of the air war on the various groups of the German population and on the cohesion and functioning of the Nazi control apparatus.

THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL EFFECTS OF AIR RAIDS ON THE GERMAN PEOPLE

a. Preliminary Survey

I. THE RAIDS

A. Extent of Impact

The strategic aerial bombing of Germany has been increased to such an extent during the last twelve months that approximately 65,000 people are now bombed out of their homes each week. The number of unusable and destroyed houses in April 1944 totaled 1,600,000 in the Reich and the protected areas. A large numberof the great industrial centers of Germany, such as Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen, the Ruhr district, Rostock, Hannover, Leipzig, Frankfurt a/M, Mannheim-Ludwigshafen, Stuttgart, Brunswick, Augsburg, Nürnberg, München, Kassel, Wiener-Neustadt, etc., have been severely damaged. In several of these cities it has been estimated that between 60 and 80 percent of the houses have been destroyed or badly damaged. In the first phase of the Battle of Berlin---from 18 November 1943 to 15 February 1944---the official report states that at least 326 factories of which 103 were of vital importance to the German war effort, were either destroyed or damaged.[1]

The manpower cost of air-raid defense and post-raid restoration constitutes a significant drain on labor resources, but the extent of this is difficult to estimate. Industrial output has probably dropped 10 to 15 percent owing to the raids.[2] In certain key industries, like ballbearings and fighter planes, the decrease of monthly output was estimated to be about 50 and 70 percent, respectively, by April 1944.[3] Likewise, the shortage of consumer goods has become acute.

About 20 million of the civilian population have been directly exposed to air-raids. Accomodations had to be provided for some 5,400,000 people, including children evacuated as a precautionary measure. Approximately 5 million have inadequate housing or no housing whatsoever. Reliable estimates as of 1 January 1944 place the number of dead to be at least 100,000.[4]

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1. New York Times, 24 March 1944.
2. Based on data supplied by Economic Capabilities Subdivision, 1 January 1944.
3. Based on data supplied by Economic Capabilities Subdivision 1 May 1944.
4. Based on data supplied by Economic Capabilities Subdivision, 1 January 1944.

In considering the direct and indirect effects of the bombings on German morale, one must bear in mind that only a limited sector of the population is exposed to them and that heavy attacks are followed by extended periods of relative quiet during which the population has time to recuperate.

B. Strains on the AD System

Over 30 different organizations are concerned with air-raid activities in Germany. In August 1943 it was estimated that more than a million members of military and para-military organizations plus approximately nine million civilians were engaged in one or another phase of air-raid precautions.[1]

The Aircraft Reporting Service (Flugmeldedienst) was controlled by the Air Forces until 31 May 1942 and the household AD organization and warden service were under the general supervision of the Air Minister, Hermann Goering. The mobile part of the municipal and defense service (fire-fighting, first-air service), which had been closely associated with the police, was then transferred to the control of Himmler, the Reich SS leader and Head of the German Police. This organization was named Air Raid Protection Police (Luftschutz-Polizei).[2] The change, which considerably strengthened the Gestapo chief's power over the home front, was made in response to signs of weakness in the control of the civilian population after the first big raids on Cologne. Failure to prevent raids was to be counteracted by terror.

A Reich decree of August 1942, which applies to most large towns, makes it compulsory for all citizens from fifteen to seventy years of age, except invalids, cripples and those with special responsibilities, to assist in the Self Protection Service. (Blockschutz; Selbstschutz). Its main task is to extinguish minor fires or to keep larger conflagrations in check until the fire brigade or Party Fire Brigade Commandos (Feuerinsatzkommandos) can come to their assistance.

Military authorities decide whether a factory is to be defended by AA, and, if so, a battery is installed and the guns are manned by the employees. In view of the intensified air warfare the Deutsche Nachrichten Bureau announced on 22 April 1944 that heavier demands on members of the staff in factories for stand-by service would have to be made. The new regulation provides for the following duty periods every month:

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1. "The Size, Organization and Function of German Civil Defense.." R & A 1071.
2. British Handbook, "Civil Defense" (1853-HB0 - Part II).

Boys of 15 years,	up to four times;
Boys between the age of 16 and 18,	up to eight times;
Male staff over 18,	up to [illegible] times;
Girls between 15 and 18,	up to four times;
Female staff over 18,	up to eight times;

Exceptions are made for expectant mothers, women with small children, wives of seriously injured men, etc. No difference is made between officials, employees, and workers.[1]

The general picture of civilian cooperation with organized ARP services is not one which indicates any widespread apathy or disaffection. It is natural that the German population is anxious to protect its property and personal belongings wherever possible. However, reports of warnings against slackers who "as soon as the air is thick" take their luggage and disappear into a bomb-proof shelter"[2] are not at all uncommon in the German press. Eyewitnesses report that in big apartment buildings the Self Protection Service is of no practical value as the tenants simply save what they can and abandon the place to the flames.

As a method of improving cooperation the Party has engaged in elaborate propaganda campaigns designed to label civilians engaged in Air Raid Protection as "front line fighters." They have been granted the same compensation rights as soldiers and several thousand have been decorated. Extra food allowances are given to ARP workers who are engaged for periods of more than 24 hours.[3] Persons who evade ARP duty by unauthorized flight from town during air raids run the risk of losing compensation for their property if it is destroyed in an air raid, "because they can be accused of neglecting their duty to avert or reduce the damage."[4]

More serious are the shortages of ARP facilities which have developed as the weight of Allied bombing increased. To overcome these difficulties all fire-brigades of Germany have been completely motorized; when large-scale attacks occur, the fire-brigades of neighboring towns are called on for assistance. These strains are only local in character and no inference of impending national collapse of the ARP system can be drawn.

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1. FCC: Daily Report, 24 April 1944.
2. Hamburger Tageblatt, 9 December 1943 (News Digest # 1320).
3. FCC: Weekly Analysis, 6 November 1943.
4. Der Führer, Karlsruhe, 23 September 1943 (News Digest # 1254).

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II. RECOVERY FROM THE RAID

A. Emergency Relief Measures

The impact of the raid momentarily disrupts the functioning of the city as a co-ordinated unit, but immediately after the all-clear signal, a complicated array of Party, government and army officials begins to operate, and within a few days cities which have suffered average raids are functioning again. Even after heavy raids a rock bottom organization soon emerges.

The task of supplying immediate emergency food and lodging falls to such party organizations as the NS People's Welfare Organization (NS Volkswohlfahrt), the German Labor Front (Deutsche Arbeitsfront), the National Socialist Motor Corps (NS Kraftfahr-Korps), and the German Red Cross (Deutsche Rote Kreuz). The Technical Emergency Corps (Technische Nothilfe) and the Todt Organization clear debris and effect demolitions. Additional labor is supplied by Army units stationed in Germany, the National Labor Service (Reichsarbeitsdienst), the Debris Removal Corps (Aufraumungstruppe), the Building Repair Corps (Bauhilfstruppe), and other agencies.[1] Within a few days the administrative controls for the readjustment of commerce, housing, communication and transportation begins to take effect.

1. Commerce. The legal grounds for the new administrative measures which must be taken are based on a decree of the Minister of Economics of 5 June 1943 and a ruling of the National Trade Group of 11 June 1943 creating the Emergency Staffs (Einsatzstabe) of Trade.[2] These staffs prepare the accumulation of reserves and establish additional storage capacities (Ausweichlager)---often outside the city limits---and traveling stores (Fliegende Verkaufsstellen) in conjunction with the Economic and Food offices. They register the stocks of retail and wholesale trade, survey air-raid damage, and report it to the Regional Economic Offices. They are also authorized to install bombed-out merchants in the premises of others, and to assign merchants to trade in specific commodities if necessary.[3]

While there have been no acute shortages in basic food requirements, the replacement of clothing and household goods has met with insuperable difficulties. To facilitate the sale of available stocks to bombed-out persons purchase permits stamped "Fl" (Fliegerbeschädigter) are issued. The inability of other civilians to obtain goods for which

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1. "The Size, Organization and Function of German Civil Defense." R & A 1071.
2. Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, 1943, No. 26, p. 795.
3. "The German Housing Position, 1939-43", R & A 1426.

they have ration stamps has led to considerable discontent. Open criticism is, however, seldom voiced in public for fear of the police.

For the protection of depositors, regulations have been issued which make it possible for depositors whose bank has been bombed to continue banking in unbombed banks.

2. Housing and Communal Feeding. At the outbreak of war in 1939 Germany had a housing shortage of at least 1,500,000 dwellings. The number of households exceeds the number of dwellings by 12 percent. The war further aggravated the housing situation, particularly in industrial and strategic areas, where in several instances from 50 to 80 % of the dwellings have either been destroyed or severely damaged. (see Section I, Extent of Damage).

Under the authority of the Reich Compensation Law (Reichsleistungsgesetz) of 1 September 1939 and a series of subsequent laws[1] bombed-out persons are in most cases quickly provided with temporary shelter, however undesirable. The chief methods employed are forced billeting in all available unbombed dwellings in the area; evacuation; transformation of attics, offices and stores into dwellings; and construction of a limited number of temporary barrack-like houses. The bombed-out persons are encouraged to build their own emergency homes with material available locally (clay, rubble, timber from destroyed houses) or with prefabricated parts. The state pays a premium of RM. 1700 for each finished edifice conforming to prescribed dimensions (20 to 22½ sq. m.). Some 40,000 prefabricated dwellings were reported to have been built in the last quarter of 1943 and the construction of another 100,000 is foreseen for 1944.[2] Industrial enterprises may release 5 percent of their staff or suitable foreign workers for the building of emergency houses if the remaining workers make good the time lost by working overtime. In order to speed up the construction of dwellings, 40,000 German workers are reported to have been removed from eastern districts, together with 100,000 war prisoners, to be used for such work.[3] In spite of all these measures the shortage in housing cannot be overcome.

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1. Decree concerning Conversion of Dwellings (Die Verordnung über die Zweckentfremdung von Wohnung) 14 August 1942, RGBl., I 545; Decree concerning Renting of Dwellings about to be Vacated (Die Verordnung über die Vermietung freiwerdender Wohnungen) 5 October 1942, RGBl., I, 573; Decree of 9 October 1942, RGBl. I, 586, empowering municipalities to take possession of dwellings in behalf of families with many children, war wounded and widows and orphans of war victims; Decree concerning Administration of Dwellings (Die Verordnung zur Wohnraumlenkung) 27 February 1943, RGBl., I 127.

2. Berliner Börsen-Zeitung, 18 February 1944; Decree of September 1943 "Deutsche Wohnungshilfwerk."

3. OSS # 31637, 18 April 1944.

As a result of the evacuation of women with small children, the destruction of homes, and the shortage of cooking ranges, communal feeding has grown to unprecedented proportions. Some 12 million German workers and civilians and 14 million foreigners now obtain their meals from camp kitchens or in workers' canteens.[1] Restaurants are overcrowded, and in several cities permits are issued to workers and civilians essential to the war entitling them to preferred treatment during rush hours. Home life seems to be almost completely disrupted in heavily bombed cities.

3. Communications and Transportation. The permanent reestablishment of communications and transportation facilities presents the most difficult problem. Aside from the effect of damaged transportation on overall industrial production, Reich officials have the problem of establishing transportation facilities adequate to distribute essential incoming supplies of food and the problem of maintaining some portion of the public utilities system. The work is largely accomplished by the Technical Emergency Aid (Technische Nothilfe) supported by battalions of prisoners of war, civilians, and in some areas by units of the Todt Organization. Despite the difficulties involved, it is significant to note that in Hamburg during the first week in Sept. 1943 (about two weeks after the last big raid) electricity, gas, and water were being supplied in an adequate fashion, trucks were bolstering the transport system, although the mail was still disrupted.[2]

4. Recreation. All eyewitness reports maintain that among the first services to be reestablished are the cinema and the theater. The need for such facilities to afford relief from strain is obvious. Party officials display a great deal of interest in this phase of restoration, and pressure is applied to mobilize the resources of the Reich Chamber of Theaters. In the summer of 1943, the head of the Artists' Section, announced in Artistenwelt the determination to proceed ruthlessly against artists who break their contracts in the air raid emergency districts and issued an official announcement stressing that air raid emergency districts are given preference in any case.[3]

The over-all picture of post-raid rehabilitation seems to be one of a rather high level of efficiency in reestablishing the basic social and economic organization of the bombed-out cities.

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1. Vestmanlands Tidning, 28 April 1944 (Press Intell. Cable).
2. Berne Cable, 4 September 1943.
3. Hamburger Tageblatt, 5 October 1943, quoting "Artistenwelt."

III. PROBLEMS OF EVACUATION

As of 1 January 1944, it was estimated that about 5 million individuals had been evacuated from bombed-out or bomb-threatened areas. Originally all evacuations from bombed districts were assigned to a specific Gau elsewhere in the Reich, which was designated as a reception area. As bombings increased and as precautionary evacuation was instituted, other Gaue in addition to the original reception areas were assigned. Finally, the bombing of reception areas made it necessary further to modify the procedure. Currently, evacuees are sent either to one of several specific regions of reception in other parts of the Reich (including occupied areas) or to unbombed parts of the Gau.[1] Disorderly flight after particularly intense bombings has occurred. The general effect of this pattern forced by increased and deeper bombings has been to bring the evacuation problems to all parts of the Reich.

Administration of the evacuation is centered in the NSV and its subdivision Camping Program for Evacuated Children (Erweiterte Kinderlandverschickung; KLV) under Arthur Axmann; it handles all precautionary evacuation of children. The Labor Front cooperates with the NSV in providing relief to the evacuees. A person may not be evacuated from his home locality unless he has procured a departure certificate from the local NSV office.

IV. THE PARTY'S PROPAGANDA REPLY

A. Treatment of Air Raids in Domestic Press and Radio

The disastrous development of the air war in the last two years has forced the Nazi propagandists to adopt a mainly defensive attitude in the treatment of air raids. The basic concepts of the Nazi propaganda up to the beginning of 1944 have been:

1. To counter belief among some Germans that the Nazis started the war.

2. To deflect dissatisfaction because the Nazis are not providing more countermeasures.

3. To combat the impression that German war production is seriously affected by the raids.

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1. "Changes in the German Plan for the Distribution of Air Raid Evacuees," R & A 1159.

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To effect these objectives the Nazis have a number of themes which were used, dropped, and reused. The most important of these were:

1. To stress the positive aspects of bombings, i.e. emergence of community feelings, civilian heroism.

2. To express sympathy with suffering victims; in particular not to withhold recognition of civilian sacrifice and not to minimise the losses sustained by individuals.

3. To praise the teamwork of the various branches of German defense ---civilian and military.

4. To expose the enemy air war as evidence of barbarism, and as immoral. (terror theme)

5. To declare the air war strategically futile.
   a) it is no shortcut to victory.
   b) it does not break the enemy, physically, morally, or militarily, but strengthens him.
   c) it inflicts heavy losses in men and material on the attacker.

6. To declare Germany equal to the challange.

7. To assure Germans that Germany would take revenge.

8. To promise rehabilitation after victory---but only then.

Faced with the belief in some quarters that bombing of civilians in the Reich was caused by Germany's prior employment of air warfare, Nazi propaganda devoted considerable energy to prove historically that England alone was responsible for initiating air war against civilians. This line was also meant to deflect hostility caused by the misery of bombings from the Nazis to the enemy. Promises of retaliation, which figured prominently in the press in the latter part of 1943, were welcomed only by a minority of the German population, who saw therein a possibility of ending the raids. The failure to supply adequate counter-measures resulted in criticism which was met by praising the work done by party members and by decorations awarded to ARP workers. The people were also assured that the leaders were not at all indifferent to their hardships. On 23 March 1943 and on 1 January 1944 Hitler went out of his way to extend sympathy to the bombed-out persons. Growing war weariness and demands for peace were countered by a campaign which painted the consequences of defeat in the most lurid colors: bolshevism in Germany, inflation, forced labor for the German people, mass

sterilizations of Germans, etc. People were exhorted to have faith in the miraculous power of the Fuehrer---in some mysterious way he would find a way out of seemingly insurmountable difficulties.

This irrational, negative approach probably deepened widespread apathy and despair on the part of the civilian population, making them still more painfully aware of their utter helplessness. Symptoms of deteriorating morale among occupational troops, which reflected the change in civilian morale, were particularly undesirable in view of the threatened Allied invasion. The resumption of the air war on London finally gave Nazi propaganda an opportunity to adopt a more positive attitude. The period of passive resistance was over, they declared, and Germany could not hope to win the war if she remained on the defensive. The Luftwaffe, far from being knocked out, was on the offensive again; according to press and radio it was winning victory after victory. London was being successfully attacked and the number of Allied planes destroyed by the Luftwaffe was tremendous. The idea that Allied attacks were terror raids was no longer stressed. Instead the attacks were dramatized as air battles in which German superior skill and striking power was proved again and again.[1] A new group of air heroes was created---aviators who were reported to have shot down from 50 to 250 Allied planes. The effect of bombings on industrial plants was minimized or even ignored " in order not to give valuable information to the enemy." The failure of the invasion to materialize in April induced the propagandists to revert again to the terror and futility themes. The air war had failed to break German morale, the Luftwaffe could not be knocked out of the skies, the attacks on industrial centers had cost more than they had accomplished, and the latest attacks on communication centers would prove a great failure.

B. Compensation and Promises of Post War Reconstruction

In September 1943 the Nazis placed compensation for home front air raid casualties on the same level with front line casualties. The Reich Minister of Finance ruled that all regulations and directives so far issued in favor of the dependents of men killed in action---including children's assistance, income tax, and death duties---shall equally apply to the dependents of fatal air raid casualties among the civilian population.[2] Already a comprehensive code of compensation had been evolved for wages, rents, and property lost through air raids. Reports seem to indicate that the compensation system works effectively to the end of supplying relief for immediate extreme hardships. But

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1. FCC: Central European Analysis, 30 December 1943, 3 March 1944.
2. FCC: Central European Analysis, 2 September 1943.

the problem of reconstruction of the vast property damage can only be met by measures which will take effect in the post-war period.

The Nazis have not hesitated to incorporate such promises into their propaganda. Speer, by an edict of Hitler,[1] was made an Inspector-General for the Building of the Reich Capital. He is responsible for the planning of the reconstruction of towns designated by Hitler as worthy of speedy reconstruction; he will "make all decisions in questions of town building." Detailed "blueprints," which assume a German victory, appear frequently in the press. Typical is an article in the Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten entitled "How Long Will It Take Us to Rebuild?" by President of the German Institute for Economic Research Prof. Dr. Ernst Wagemann,[2] Wagemann reaches the conclusion that if the entire nation concentrated on that task, all the damage that the RAF could conceivably inflict throughout the war could be repaired within a decade. With the issues of survival for the Nazi Party being decided at the front and in the air, such promises are relatively easy to make.

V. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL EFFECTS

A. Social

1. Further Impoverishment of the Middle Classes. With respect to physical destruction and loss of property, the middle classes have probably been the hardest hit. The workers, who did not have much property to lose, are in many cases housed in barracks at the outskirts of the cities; the rural population is relatively secure from heavy raids, and the wealthy classes are better equipped and better protected. The middle classes had already lost most heavily by the closing-down of non-essential shops and offices and by the process of economic concentration; now they experience the destruction of their homes and the dissolution of their families. It is not surprising that the Nazi regime takes great pains to placate these groups by the most lavish promises for the future. The air war has led to a decentralization of plant facilities which, in the Nazi propaganda, is being presented as a breaking-up of the large combines and as a restoration of small and medium enterprises. Moreover, the increasing need for craftsmen and artisans to repair raid damages apparently testifies to the strengthened position of these lower middle class professions in the Nazi economic system.

2. Isolation of the workers from the other strata of the population. In the large cities, which have been most frequently exposed to air raids, large parts of the population except the workers essential to the war,

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1. Reichsgesetzblatt, 26 October 1943.
2. Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten, 21 December 1943 (News Digest # 1329).

have been evacuated or have evacuated themselves. This isolates and distinguishes the workers in a peculiar way, which may have far-reaching implications for future developments:

a. It must almost inevitably strengthen the class consciousness of the workers, who, as a specific social group, constitute the shock troops of the home front. As such, they are visibly and daily exposed to special dangers and are stimulated by special privileges (higher and extra rations, efficiency rewards, etc.). This class consciousness in itself is by no means a revolutionary one: for the time being at least, it rather strengthens the tie with the Nazi regime which has so far been able to take care of the immediate needs of the workers. However, the same tendencies which make for the workers' acceptance of the Nazi regime as long as it is capable of keeping the machinery going may quickly turn into radical opposition when the machinery has broken down. Then, the distinction and isolation of the workers from the other strata of the population may become a cohesive force to overcome the atomizing tendencies of Nazi mass domination; this would make the workers a more or less homogeneous group in the fight for social reconstruction.

b. The foreign workers have been exposed to the same isolation. Although they are separated from the German workers as far as possible in their housing, leisure, and working conditions, they inevitably belong to the distinct group of non-evacuees who form the active core of the home front. There are many indications that despite constant supervision and the difficulties of language, fraternization between German and foreign workers takes place. The extent of such fraternization should not be overstressed: it is probably first of all an entirely unpolitical matter of help and pity. Here too, the significance of this tendency lies in its future potentialities. Simple human solidarity might turn into a political weapon when the Nazi controls are destroyed.

3. Increasing antagonisms between the rural and urban population. The continuous air raids increase the antagonisms between the rural and urban population on three different grounds:

a. Difference in the standard of living. Although the vast majority of the German peasants lived far below the standard of the urban middle classes and even of a large part of the industrial workers, the peasants have apparently succeeded in retaining for themselves more and better food than the urban population.

b. Greater security of the rural population.

c. Tension between hosts and evacuees. The steady influx of bombed-out city dwellers, who frequently look down on the peasant's way of life and his relative security, has certainly increased the peasant's animosity against the city people.

4. Strengthening of the regional differences within the Reich. They are closely connected with the antagonisms discussed in the previous section (#3). The bombed-out people have frequently been evacuated to reception areas where the population differs widely from the "guests" in temperament, religion, social composition, etc. This would for example be the case if Rhinelanders were evacuated to East Prussia or the Warthegau, or Hamburgers to Bavaria and Austria. It must be emphasized again that these differences are not of a political nature and do not warrant any assumptions as to the strength of future separatist tendencies in Germany.

5. Further disintegration of the family and of control over youth. Wholesale evacuation and migration has naturally led to a separation of husband and wife, parents and children. Even when the family stays together the exigencies of air raids make effective control over youth extremely difficult: reports on juvenile delinquents are becoming increasingly numerous. On the other hand, the same exigencies provide new ways and forms of occupying youth and thus binding it to the Nazi control apparatus (auxiliary police, relief and fire squads, etc.). In the last analysis, however, the effects of the air war probably tend to increase the difficulties in the control over youth because the essential services which the juveniles perform and the authority which they exercise during and immediately after the raids may strengthen their self-consciousness and their will to greater freedom.

6. Administrative dislocations. Disruptions in the system of transportation and communication, of utilities, rationing etc. occur after almost every large scale air raid. Housing of the bombed-out people is encountering increasingly difficulty. Disruption of banking service is frequently reported. With a few exceptions, however, the Nazi administration has been able to restore very quickly all these services on an emergency basis sufficiently strong for the maintenance of the whole administrative system. Some government offices have apparently been removed from Berlin (probably to Silesia and suburbs of Berlin) but this has not seriously affected the functioning of the governmental machinery.

B. Political.

1. Increasing dependence of the population on the Nazi Party as an agency of relief and protection. While it is universally recognized that the obvious inability of the Nazi regime to prevent or even to protect Germany effectively against the intensified air war must inevitably undermine the regime's reputation among the German people, another much less evident but perhaps not less effective tendency has not yet

been sufficiently emphasized---that the civilian population is becoming ever more dependent of the functioning of the Nazi relief organizations. As a Swiss paper recently put it:[1]

> The bombings have played into the hands of the Gestapo in a way, as the people are deprived of food, clothing and homes, so that their naked existence is dependent on the mercy of the party and the organs of government which control the very necessities of life. This applies chiefly to the cities, and the cities are mothers of all revolution.

The Party was quick to take advantage of this situation: it has apparently extended the functions and services of the relief agencies which look after the most urgent needs of the affected people. The officials and institutions which were first of all organs of terroristic political control thus assume the appearance of organs of humanitarian help and protection (the Blockwart of the Nazi Party, for example, takes over the renewal and distribution of ration cards). Without these agencies, the population would suffer utter distress and ultimate destruction.

2. Dislocation of labor and police controls. The destruction of files, records, offices, etc, by air raids facilitates the evasion of the strict labor controls prevalent in Nazi Germany. Numerous reports state that workers do not show up at their working places, that they fail to register if their places of employment have been destroyed, that they move without authorization to other regions.

The same holds true for the system of police controls. In many cases, the Gestapo files have been destroyed, and "suspicious" people could turn up in other places and get new identity cards, presenting themselves as bombed-out workers.

The Nazi regime has so far been able to cope with these dislocations, chiefly because of the tight and comprehensive rationing scheme, which makes any free movement of the population almost impossible.

The frequent "economic crimes" which are reported as taking place during and after air raids, especially by foreign workers (looting, stealing, etc.) may sooner or later become a political factor. Even now, individual acts of revenge against Nazis, SS men, etc. are allegedly being perpetrated. Such reports have come from Berlin and Munich.

3. Advantages and disadvantages for anti-Nazi opposition. With respect to the anti-Nazi opposition, the air war seems to have an ambiguous effect. On the one hand, there can be no doubt that the opportunities for

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1. Sie und Er, quoted in OSS A-25526-a, 19 April 1944.

There is no justification for the assumption that the air war has fundamentally changed the traditional attitude towards property prevalent among the majority of the German population.

C. General Conclusions

Manifold as the effects of the air raids on the German population may be, they have one common characteristic---they tend to absorb all political issues into personal issues, on the national as well as individual levels. The impact of the raids on the personal life of the individuals is so great that it obliterates all problems which go beyond the immediate questions of mere survival. For the time being at least, this attitude amounts to an obliteration of the social and political antagonisms which continue to exist within the Nazi "people's community." The conflicts of interests between capital and labor, between the landed aristocracy and the peasants, between the authoritarian and the democratic forces, are suspended under the necessities of the daily struggle for the mere maintenance of life, a struggle in which the Nazi government and the Nazi Party take an effective leadership. Several reports on prisoner of war interrogations draw attention to a significant change in the attitude towards the Nazi regime: the latter is increasingly regarded, not as a definite political or social system, but as the legitimate national government of the Reich which is alone capable of protecting the individuals and the nation from complete annihilation.[1] This "unpolitical" attitude was found even among non-Nazis and anti-Nazis.[2] It is to a great extent the combined result of the air war and of the lack of any specification of the unconditional surrender formula which makes the present government of the Reich appear as the only bastion against personal and national destruction.

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1. "Faced with imminent peril the German people instinctively rally round anything that represents the idea of authority and are grateful to their leaders for not losing their heads and acting and thinking in their stead." (Feuille d'Avis, Neuchâtel, 15 April 1944; News Digest 1425, B 23).
2. A former German worker who was with the revolutionaries in 1918/19, writes to his emigré son:

   > The situation is quite different from what it was in 1918. Today we are really fighting against enemies who want to annihilate us. Under those circumstances all our points of dissension disappear." (OSS, CID # 65652, 6 March 1944).
   >
   > Out of fear for the future everyone will fight on, and the workers are prepared to produce even greater results than in the past (same source).

perpetrating acts of sabotage and for evading Gestapo control are greatly increased. On the other hand, the dislocations in the system of control also work in disfavor of the opposition. The migration of factories and of personnel disrupts the organization of the opposition: new contacts have to be made, new surroundings to be exploited, etc. The question which of the two conflicting tendencies will prevail cannot yet be answered; it may be significant, however, that so far no large scale sabotage and unrest during and after air raids have been reliably reported.

4. Resentment against the privileged elite. The resentment of the affected population seems primarily to be directed against the prominent Nazis. They are not only better protected but they apparently also enjoy other privileges. Reports such as the following are typical:[1]

> The fact that only people close to the Party can obtain transportation for their belongings and ship them out of Berlin causes bitter resentment. Nobody else can obtain trucks or wagons, because they have all been requisitioned by the authorities. The whole population of Berlin is sitting in a mousetrap.

This attitude does not contradict the tendency discussed in # 6. The population apparently makes a definite distinction between the Party as an indispensable institution of daily life and the parasites who are a disgrace to the Party as well as to the home front.

5. Changes in the attitude towards property. Much has been made of reports stating that large parts of the German population are turning under the impact of the air war towards communism. It is said that a general levelling of the population is taking place, that many people lose respect for private property and that they would not mind too much if the whole institution should be abolished altogether. Many of these reports must be discarded as German propaganda spread to increase the fear of a bolshevized Europe after the defeat of Nazism. It is unquestionably true that a process of equalization is going on between the middle classes and the industrial workers, but nothing indicates that it works in favor of communist tendencies. As far as the middle classes are concerned, the loss of property has only strengthened the desire to regain it; they see in communism a form of life that would perpetuate their losses. As regards the workers, numerous reports indicate that a majority is still averse to all experiments which would necessarily involve civil war and a new dictatorship. Even in so far as as they are inclined to accept communism as a post-war solution, they want a decidedly non-bolshevist society, perhaps one which combines the nationalization of key industries with the full exercise of democratic rights and liberties.

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1. OSS A-23915, 31 March 1944.

At the same time, there seems to be no wide-spread feeling of increased hatred against the British and American "terror raiders." This does not mean that the population puts the blame for the air war on the Nazi regime: only a very small minority seems to realize that "area bombing" was started by the Luftwaffe. It is rather the general political apathy which makes the population suffer the air raids as one of the inevitable implications of total war. It would only be natural that the German people should be inclined to differentiate between the Western Powers on the one hand and the Russians on the other; the latter so far have not started area bombing of Germany. Some reports state that such a distinction is actually being made, and that the "prestige" of the Russians is increasing. However, this tendency (which is certainly confined to a very small part of the population) seems to be effectively counteracted by the terrible fear of bolshevism which holds the vast majority of the German people in its grip and which is continuously exploited by Nazi propaganda.

Most of the social and political effects of air raids discussed above seem to play into the hands of the Nazi regime and to strengthen the cohesion of the home front. The counter-tendencies are being neutralized by the ever-growing importance of the Nazi control apparatus for the maintenance of the life of the population. If this apparatus breaks down and is no longer capable of sustaining the bare life of the population, the forces which now make for the cohesion of the home front and for the stiffening of its resistance will have lost their basis. The complete disintegration of the home front may then be expected to occur almost overnight.